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  Christopher S. Yates
Abstract
Contemporary film aesthetics is beset by difficulties arising
from the medium itself and the bewildering itinerary of film
theory. Inspired by Martin Heidegger's hermeneutical vision in
"On the Origin of the Work of Art" (1935), my essay seeks to
overcome this paralysis by grounding the aesthetic value of
cinematic art in its ability to "disclose the world" through a
convergence of artist and viewer intentionalities. Stanley
Cavell has gone far by exploring a corresponding "natural
relation" between philosophy and cinema, but his work
assumes an ontological discourse without an appropriate
phenomenological method. I contend that Mikel Dufrenne's
phenomenology of aesthetic experience provides the formal
structure necessary for speaking of film's ontological
possibilities. Terrence Malick's cinematic and narrative uses of
point-of-view illustrate one such experience of worlddisclosure.
Key Words
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hermeneutics, intentionality, Martin Heidegger, Mikel
Dufrenne, ontology, phenomenology, point-of-view, reduction,
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1. Introduction
As film has ascended to a prominent, public position in the
arts over the last 100 years and the scope of aesthetics has
found a diverse bearing on matters of inquiry, meaning and
human existence, film and philosophy find themselves in a
position of necessary, albeit uncertain, communication. The
result is that we remain faced with a fundamental question: In
what can the aesthetic value of film consist?
At least two hesitations threaten to forestall any attempt to
train the rigors of aesthetic discourse on this peculiar moving
canvas. First, the manner in which we encounter these "works
of art" is already encumbered with a big-budget paradigm of
consumer entertainment. We speak of "Hollywood" as though
it is this multifaceted, instrumentalist 'other' generating
stories, celebrities, values and escapes. Is it not naïve to
speak of truth, beauty and meaning in the context of an
artistic paradigm that is decidedly defined by commercial
pursuits? Second, there is the mercurial and indefinite nature
of film theory, studies and critique. With the establishment of
the Cinema Studies Department at New York University in the
1970s, the first program of its kind, film seemed to attain to
the level of a fine art, meriting a corresponding academic
discipline. >From there, the way toward a film aesthetic took
many detours: cognitive film theory, realism, simulacrum and
thought theories and finally, in the work of Stanley Cavell, the
approach to film as philosophy.[1] "Despite this flurry of
interest," argues Thomas Wartenberg, "there has been only
minimal sustained reflection on the theoretical issues

surrounding the use of film to discuss philosophical topics."[2]
Indeed, as the Winter 2006 edition of The Journal of Aesthetics
and Art Criticism roundly evidences, the integrity of attributing
"philosophical content" to this medium is far from certain.[3]
Is it not possible that, implicit in such debates, there stands
the more fundamental need to answer for film's aesthetic
credibility? What, after all, is film as art? How is filmic
discourse to be read?
Taken together, these hesitations would seem to suggest that
any baptism of the film medium by the waters of aesthetics is
in the very least a precarious blessing. And yet there are films
which, in their cinematic quality and meaning, do invite or
perhaps compel philosophical engagement. Are there not still
more resources within the discipline of philosophy and the field
of aesthetics which may reposition and improve the plausibility
of such engagement? Although I agree with Paisley
Livingston's recent assertion that films "can provide vivid and
emotionally engaging illustrations of philosophical issues,"[4]
my present concern is less with the idea of film as philosophy
as with elaborating a philosophical conception of the cinematic
event. In this way I am likewise attentive to the Deleuzian
interest in the generative "apparatus" of cinema,[5] but
maintain a concern for delimiting the very experience of
givenness attained through the peculiarities of this medium.
Bearing this trajectory in mind, I propose that between Martin
Heidegger's hermeneutical vision for the "work" of art and
Stanley Cavell's ontology of film there is, in phenomenology, a
formal structure for addressing the experience of cinematic art
as a convergence of two horizons of intentionality.[6] The
result, I argue, is a disclosure of "world" on which the
aesthetic value of film may rest.
2. The Work of Art as World Disclosure
Midway through his 1935 lectures on The Origin of the Work of
Art, Martin Heidegger set before his audience a Van Gogh
painting of the commonest of common things: a pair of
peasant shoes. What is at work in the work? he asked. How
might one look beyond the mere "equipmental" quality of the
shoes in order to grasp their essential Being? [7]. Implicit in
these questions was the aim of closing the interpretive
distance between the beholder and the experience of art
revealing itself as truth.
In and through the shoes, noted Heidegger, a world is
revealed. Where, typically, the "thingly substructure" of the
work is the most "immediate actuality" encountered by the
beholder, Heidegger sets the aesthetic mode in a posture of
watchfulness so that the beholder might discern something of
an underlying essence from within the work. He avers that the
modern inclination to map conceptual frameworks and thingly
assumptions onto an aesthetic crossroads of beholding subject
and representational object in effect "shackles reflection."[8]
By ushering us into the experience of the work, and the world
embodied in the work, however, Heidegger holds that artistic
creation allows a thing to "emerge as a thing that has been
brought forth" and there exist as an open region within the
existential "thrownness" of all beings.[9] This transformation
recalls the movement from '"anxiety"' to '"concern"' in Being
and Time; upon finding itself not-at-home (uncanny,

Unheimlichkeit) in the world of commonly accepted objects
and meanings, Dasein recalls its capacity to bestow meaning
and enacts this transcendence through and among the
relevance of factical things. This resurgence of concern, or
care, delivers one's human reality from merely public norms
and allows objects to present themselves in terms of more
personalized significance.[10] In the aesthetic event, then, far
from inviting the spectator out of his or her world into a place
of expressive retreat, art assumes the burden of the
spectator's philosophical situation in-the-world and seeks to
give the spectatorthe world of his or her being.[11] The
beholder is released from the momentary feeling of dis-ease
or complicity, and toward the 'whole' range of possibilities and
ends specified according to his or her worldhood.
Consider, along such lines, the ability of films to capture a
sense of being-in-the-world, and a corresponding summons to
renewed 'concern' by photographing the ordinary, uncanny
elements of existence. Terrence Malick's Days of Heaven
(1978) opens with images of a Chicago steel mill: junk-pickers
kicking through debris, coal shoveled into a furnace, the
pouring of molten iron. Then there are waves of golden Great
Plains wheat, a silhouetted scarecrow and signalmen flags
carrying their message from hill to hill. The result is a
seamless visual experience where the subtlety of specific
things is drawn out to indicate the nature of the world and the
life of our protagonists.
Heidegger's essay, says John Carvalho, "establishes the
ontology of art as a prescient insight into reality. . .."[12]
How, then, might this hermeneutics of world-disclosure answer
the question: In what can the aesthetic value of a film consist?
Can a work of cinematic art shape the gaze of the viewer so
that he or she sees and experiences the world afresh?
Answering this already implies a deployment of aesthetic
judgments, beyond questions of beauty and taste, to the
ubiquitous acts of consciousness which shape an aesthetic
experience. But is a resulting ontological aesthetic here
plausible? To answer these questions I will discuss Stanley
Cavell's recent work in film philosophy, and then describe how
a phenomenology of aesthetic experience might provide a
methodological basis that is otherwise lacking in Cavell.
3. Toward a Structure of Converging Intentionalities
More than philosophical talk about the nature of art or certain
art works, aesthetics, says J.M. Bernstein, "explores the
discursive expression of the logic of experience, the necessities
of experience for meaning, which the making and judging of
artworks reveal (because they crystallize them)".[13] This
"experience," which Heidegger has radicalized for us according
to the disclosure of worldhood and truth, might, in the case of
film, consist in the convergence of two horizons of
intentionality. There is the assemblage of the filmmaker's
intentionalities concerning narrative, cinematography, music,
pacing and so on, and there are the intentionalities of a given
viewer who comes to engage the world storied upon the
screen. If we take "'intentionality"' in its phenomenological
sense concerning the manner in which consciousness is
inherently directed towards an object - that is, it is
consciousness of something by means of intending acts which

make it possible for objects to be intuited and/or how objects
appear within the temporal flow of experience - it would seem
that the constitution of the filmic world is achieved jointly by
the artist andthe artist's viewer.
Stanley Cavell, perhaps more than any other contemporary
thinker, has gone to great lengths to celebrate the
philosophical weight of this peculiar filmic experience. In his
pioneering work, The World Viewed (1971), he presents an
ontology of film based on the idea that, by screening reality,
movies shape human perception of the ordinary in a way that
inspires acknowledgment. By defining film as a "succession of
automatic world projections," Cavell holds that the reality in
film is not merely "present" to the viewer on the screen, but is
dynamic and automatically reproduces the world externally to
the viewer. If a tree branch is viewed on a movie screen, he
argues, it is in the world and the world is in the viewed branch
- in "that thing now, in the frame of nature."[14] The
categories of succession and projection are meant to include
the stylistic decisions directors make regarding the cutting
from one view to another (montage) and the possibility of
continuous projection (which would use depth of focus and
camera position changes to suggest succession, i.e.,
continuity).[15]
Cavell's ontological focus is reminiscent of Heidegger's. Film's
attention to silence, mythology and scope attune the viewer's
attention to the "uncanny" nature of the ordinary world. We
thus long for a "natural relation" to film, and so "haunt" the
world of film and the "moral philosophy internal to the stories
that movies are forever telling."[16] But Cavell arrives at an
ontological landscape for film, so to speak, without paying
sufficient attention to the aesthetic and phenomenological
paths necessary for getting there. That he speaks of the
relationship of the viewer to the work of art as one of
"haunting" is, moreover, indicative of the fact that Cavell's
"necessary" relation between philosophy and film still lingers in
the interpretive distance between subjective viewers and
objective works.[17] We wish for the transcendence embodied
in the screened world, but are left drifting above the world of
being that is bracketed outside of the theater.
If accounting for the convergence of two horizons of
intentionality in cinema and the disclosure of "worlds" that this
obtains, is one central aim of a film aesthetic, then the ground
between Heidegger's radical interpretation of visual art and
Cavell's ambitious philosophy of film should be mapped
according to a deliberate phenomenology of aesthetic
experience. For this reason I now turn to Mikel Dufrenne and
the transcendence that may occur in the convergence of
aesthetic intentionalities.
Three methodological points demonstrated by Dufrenne in his
mid-twentieth century Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience
(1953, 1973) should help secure the notion of "world" as
central to an experiential or ontological film aesthetic. First,
there is his parallelism between phenomenological reduction
and aesthetic experience. Reduction, following Husserl,
involves "the mental operation of placing transcendent,
transphenomenal aspects of experience - especially the ontic
trait of empirical reality or existence - in 'brackets'." The

"efficacy" of these aspects in fixing the contours of conscious
experience is thus suspended in the brackets. That is, we set
aside for the moment the assumption that the world is
knowable as a categorical whole of individual objects in order
to then consider the plane of experience from which this view
originates. In the aesthetic experience of art (assuming the
work is of dramatic character) the spectator grants such a
reduction spontaneously, almost as a reflex, withholding
"credence in the content of [the] experience as actually
present or taking place."[18]
Second, the aesthetic reduction, while spontaneous, is not
static but is already on its way to a species of transcendence
between the subjective viewer and the artistic object.
Aesthetic perception suspends disbelief in order to effect a
reconciliation by means of the "sensuous:" the element in art
that is shared by both parties. Art illuminates "the real" by
means of feeling, and feeling enables a kind of communion
between the viewer's consciousness and the work's
expressiveness. (Dufrenne elsewhere likens this feeling to
"sympathy"). The feeling is of two kinds: "the depth of the
expressed world and the depth of the beholder of this world."
It is thus not only a culmination of aesthetic experience but a
"reciprocity of two depths." Through the "reading of
expression" and by "drawing on the resources of his own
feeling" the spectator engages with the artist's subjectivity as
expressed in the object.[19] This means a reconciliation occurs
because the "sensuous element in art is something shared by
the spectator and by the aesthetic object." Dufrenne argues
that the reconciliation is enabled by the "transcendental" or "a
priori" dimension of this experience. Here, explains Edward
Casey, the "affective quality" of the work not only
characterizes the expressed world but also constitutes it,
ordering the expressed world according to a cosmological point
of reference.[20] The subject likewise possesses the a priori
constitutive quality which the work awakens, and the two meet
in an "existential" unity. The subject and the object undergo a
reconciliation by, in effect, recalling their prior unity as person
and world.
Finally, where the reconciliation has ontological underpinnings
there is also a means of locating truth in the aesthetic
experience. Art "can be true -can bear on the real - because
both art and reality are themselves only aspects of an allencompassing being." Art thus "illuminates" the real, and it
does so, again, through feeling, which "delivers the real's
'affective essence'" from within the art work itself.[21] Truth is
conveyed by the affective quality in the sensuous.[22]
Taken together, Dufrenne has used a transcendental a priori
to lead us from the phenomenological in aesthetic experience
to the ontological, the being of persons affected by truth in the
sensuous element of art. And while phenomenological method
may initially assume a species of subject-object dichotomy,
Dufrenne's use of it overcomes the dichotomy, at least in the
momentary experience, because the existential "polar terms"
within the object's subjective expression and the viewing
subject communicate with each other in the "vital interaction
called forth by aesthetic experience."[23] The human factor of
the transcendence is not eliminated, but is affirmed as a
gateway through which the ontological carries truth.

How do these elucidations inform a centering of the aesthetic
experience of cinematic art on the ontological event of worlddisclosure? We recall that film is a peculiar species of art with
an equally peculiar form of dissemination. There is a
convergence of intentionalities between the filmmaker and
audience, both of which, if we are to radicalize Dufrenne's
points, are structurally joined in the physical bracketing which
occurs in the theater environment. Dufrenne's attention to the
sensuous element in art gestures toward Cavell's idea of the
abiding, albeit momentarily fissured, natural relation between
the world of film and the world of the viewer.
The result is a two-fold disclosure of worlds. Entering the
theater I go "on leave" from my ordinary world and sit in the
darkness before a massive and beautiful world where I am
"unseen." Here the film will shape my perception and position
me in a screened world in which visual objects and narrative
moments carry the determined weight of ultimate
concerns.[24] Following the viewing, my own world gives itself
to me in an uncanny way. The theater hallway, the parking lot,
the route home, all the projects and things I return to have an
other-worldly feel in the short interval after the film is finished
but before I have fully left its storied world. A fusion of
horizons has occurred. The work of the art has illuminated the
real, the world of finitude and subjectivity which artist and
viewer must together assume as a point of reference, but
which, as Heidegger and Cavell have observed, is too often
covered over by our forgetfulness, objectification and
unreflective estrangement. (Taken in this way, the title of
Terrence Malick's 2005 work, The New World, in effect
describes the accomplishment, the illuminative recovery, of
this filmic disclosure.)
4. Point-of-view and the Disclosure of World
If all of the above has served to describe the formal structure
of an aesthetic experience of world-disclosure in film, an
example of such a film and such an experience needs mention.
Malick's third feature, the 1998 The Thin Red Line, focuses
upon the lives, deaths and thoughts of a rifle company in
combat. Drawing our attention to the worlds within and around
his tragically world-bound characters, Malick's unusual
cinematic mood is established by a rare stylistic and thematic
emphasis on point-of-view.
Point of view is the phrase commonly applied to camera shots
that assume the height, position and perspective of a given
character. The Thin Red Line's opening sequence of shots
beneath a forest canopy and among a community of tribal
islanders immediately aligns the viewer's perspective with that
of Witt, the main character. The viewed elements appear to us
with a richness of color, texture, form and situatedness in the
world. The beauty of the rendered images fills us, as it does
the characters, with a mood of wonder and awe, and this
mood is elaborated by the use of visual juxtaposition: the
coming shots of nature and life in the throes of strife and
finitude. Our contemplation, as with that primarily of Witt, will
be triggered by the seeming incoherence of the juxtapositions.
Malick likewise breaks with traditional cinematography by
favoring point-of-view shots over establishing shots. In most
feature films, establishing shots are used to provide an

objective glimpse at the scene of coming action. Malick,
however, prefers to make his transitions from shot to shot by
revealing the line of action as that which a given character is
witnessing and is already immersed in. His intentionality, then,
is to provide a subjective emphasis in his shot selection. A
soldier opens a locket to look at a picture of his wife. Another
soldier wanders around the battlefield, crazed, insanely
lamenting his inability to die. A pair of hands are clasped in
prayer at night. When the hill-top bunkers are taken, we
follow Witt's gaze at the group of young, emaciated, half-mad
Japanese soldiers. There is the dead face of a Japanese
soldier, his body buried in the dirt. We reckon, with Witt, at
the arbitrary fact of our inhabiting a living point-of-view while
the view from the face of the dead is now lost.
Throughout this and other Malick films, the emphasis on
cinematic point-of-view allows the world, in the language of
phenomenology, to give itself to our consciousness. Insofar as
his characters are themselves preoccupied with ontological
concerns - the reckoning with finitude, the meaning of life, the
peculiar significance of things - the result is all the more
illustrative. As an artist, Malick is intuitively aware that the
work of his art can accomplish a convergence of viewer
intentionalities concerning the truth of the world with his own.
He thus prepares the way for a fusion of horizons resulting in
an aesthetic experience that looks through the screen to a
field of existential reflection.
In order to answer the question "in what can the aesthetic
value of film consist?" according to the phenomenon of world
disclosure, I have sought to bypass the congestion and
confusion of recent film theory by drawing upon
phenomenology and hermeneutics. With Heidegger and Cavell,
I have focused on the work of a work of cinematic art and the
experience it invites. With Dufrenne, I have explored the
theoretical basis for a shared reduction in the aesthetic
experience which allows for what I call the convergence of
intentionalities. And with Terrence Malick's work, I have begun
to illustrate how such a resulting aesthetic value of worlddisclosure might be articulated. My goal has been to suggest a
particular way the aesthetics of this peculiar medium. Andrey
Tarkovsky, speaking from the side of the artist, has stated:
"[I]f the vision of the world that has gone into the film turns
out to be one that other people recognize as a part of
themselves that up till now has never been given expression,
what better motivation could there be for one's work."[25] My
contention is that by orienting our aesthetic to the
phenomenon of world-disclosure, philosophers might achieve a
corresponding accomplishment.
Endnotes
[1] It is indicative of this congestion and confusion within film
aesthetics that Noël Carroll, in many ways the grandfather of
American film theory, has remarked: "Perhaps I once thought
that an argument for the primacy of film interpretation could
be cobbled together out of considerations like those just cited.
But I no longer do." Noel Carroll, Interpreting the Moving
Image (Cambridge; New York, NY: Cambridge University
Press, 1998, Cambridge Studies in Film) p. 5.
[2] Thomas E. Wartenberg, "Beyond Mere Illustration: How

Films Can Be Philosophy," in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art
Criticism, 64/1 (Winter, 2006), 19. Hereafter cited as JAAC.
[3] Murray Smith and Thomas E. Wartenberg, "Introduction,"
in JAAC, 3.
[4] Paisley Livingston, "The Very Idea of Film as Philosophy,"
in JAAC, 11.
[5] Ibid., Smith and Wartenberg, JAAC, 2
[6] "Horizons" denotes, with Hans-Georg Gadamer, the
specifically hermeneutical character of our experience of the
world. This is opposed to a metaphysically conditioned ideal of
knowledge and does not take interpretation to be a purely
epistemic or noetic event. "Horizon" is akin to "situation," the
locus of understanding in terms of our own projects and
questions. Being situated in a horizon thus means we have
certain interpretive "dispositions" that we carry with us into the
meeting with a work of art, which itself, as issuing from a
horizon, contains its own dispositions. One goal of a
phenomenological approach to cinema is to draw these
dispositions and questions into foreground of the aesthetic
experience. For a discussion of philosophical hermeneutics and
the role of Gadamer, see Jean Grondin, Introduction to
Philosophical Hermeneutics, trs. Joel Weinsheimer (New Haven
and London: Yale University Press, 1994).
[7] Martin Heidegger, (ed.). David Farrell Krell, "The Origin of
the Work of Art," in Basic Writings (New York, NY:
HarperSanfrancisco, 1993, 1977) pp. 159-60.
[8] Ibid., pp. 156, 162.
[9] Ibid., pp. 185, 196.
[10] See sections 40 and 41 of Martin Heidegger's Being and
Time, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson
(San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1962).
[11] We are reminded of Wordsworth's own effort to arouse
people from their "torpor" by making "the incidents of common
life interesting," and so to bring them home.
[12] John Carvalho, "Two new Anthologies on Continental
Aesthetics," (www.aesthetics-online.org/ideas/carvalho.html)
5.
[13] J.M. Bernstein, "Aesthetics, Modernism, Literature:
Cavell's Transformations of Philosophy," in Richard Eldridge
(ed.), Stanley Cavell (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press, 2003) p. 111.
[14] Ibid., p. 200. He remarks: "I was led to consider that
what makes the physical medium of film unlike anything else
on earth lies in the absence of what it causes to appear to us;
that is to say, in the nature of our absence from it; in its fate
to reveal reality and fantasy (not by reality as such, but) by
projections of reality, projections in which. . . reality is freed to
exhibit itself." Stanley Cavell, The World Viewed: Reflections
on the Ontology of Film (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University
Press, 1979, 1971) p. 166.
[15] Ibid., p. 73.

[16] William Rothman, "Cavell on Film, Television, and Opera,"
in R. Eldridge, Stanley Cavell, p. 221.
[17] Ibid., Cavell, p. 160. With respect to a fundamental
ontology, Cavell's conception of "haunting" could be set in
contrast with Heidegger's understanding of "resoluteness"
wherein Dasein as authentic Being-one's-Self "does not detach
[itself] from its world nor does it isolate [itself] so that it
becomes a free-floating 'I'." See Martin Heidegger, Being and
Time, trs. John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (New York:
Harper & Row, 1962) p. 344/298. Further, it should be noted
that Cavell's approach to film ontology by way of ordinary
language philosophy and philosophical acknowledgment has
nuances and merits that go beyond the scope of this paper.
However, the central burden of language, which grounds this
philosophical orientation, focuses on the communicative
discourse of film and not on its inherently visual medium.
Relevant to my critique is the view that, as such, film lends
itself more toward a phenomenological rather than linguistic
approach.
[18] Mikel Dufrenne, (trs.). Edward Casey, The
Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience (Evanston, Illinois:
Northwestern University Press, 1973) p. xviii.
[19] Ibid.,pp. xxxi; 483; xxx.
[20] Ibid., pp. xxxi-xxxii.
[21] Ibid., pp. xxxiii.
[22] Dufrenne explains: "By allowing us to perceive an
exemplary object whose whole reality consists in being
sensuous, art invites us and trains us to read expression and
to discover the atmosphere which is revealed only to feeling.
Art makes us undergo the absolute experience of the
affective." Ibid., Dufrenne, p. 542.
[23] Ibid., p. xxxiv.
[24] As filmmaker Andrey Tarkovsky puts it, "Through poetic
connections feeling is heightened and the spectator is made
more active. He becomes a participant in the process of
discovering life, unsupported by ready-made deductions from
the plot or ineluctable pointers by the author. He has at his
disposal only what helps to penetrate to the deeper meaning
of the complex phenomena represented in front of him."
Andrey Tarkovsky, (trs.) Kitty Hunter-Blair. Sculpting in Time:
Reflections on the Cinema (Austin, Texas: University of Texas
Press, 1987, 1986) pp. 19-20.
[25] Ibid., p. 12.
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